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or proceeding shall be allowed or maintained against such sheriff,
for or by reason of his having obeyed any such writ or order."
By section 2 it is enacted that "this act shall take effect immediately." The sheriff is not liable for a mere involuntary escape, as
where the prisoner accidentally or involuntarily goes beyond the
liberties, bounded only by an imaginary line, and returns immediately, before action brought: Ballon v. Kip, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 175;
.Kip v. Babcock, Id.. 178 ; Peters v. ifenry, 6 Id. 121.
H-UGHi

NEw YoRK.

WEIGHTMAN.

(To be continued.)
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Supreme Court of the United States.
THE MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. C.0.
I HIGGINBOTHAM, ADMINISTRATOR OF MARTHA J. DAY.
A policy of life insurance having been determined by the failure to pay the presnium falling due July 16th, the insured, on October Ist, applied for a reinstatement of the policy, gave a physician's certificate as to his health and paid the premium to an agent, who forwarded the application and certificate to the company;
the company reinstated the policy and sent its receipt, dated as of the preceding
July 16th, to the agent, who, on October 14th, delivered it to the insured : Held,
that the representation of the insured as to his health on October 1st was not continuous, and that in the absence of any representations on the 14th, a failure to
communicate any change of condition of health between the 1st and that date did
not constitute a misrepresentation.
The preliminary proofs presented to an insurance company, in compliance with
the conditions of the policy, are admissible as primafacie evidence of the facts
stated therein against the insured.
An admission must be taken as an entirety, with its qualifications making for,
as well as against, the party making it.
Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32, followed.

IN error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
This was an action by Mrs. Martha J. Day against the Mutual
:Benefit Life Insurance Company, incorporated by the state of New
Jersey, to recover the amount of a policy of insurance, issued to
Mrs. Day upon the life of her husband, Dr. Richard H. B. Day,
of Washington, in which judgment was rendered against the company for the amount insured, $5000, and interest. The policy, dated the 16th of July 1869, was for life, and stipulated for the payment of the annual premium of $187.50, on or
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before twelve o'clock on the 16th day of July in every year, and
provided that "in case the said premium shall not be paid on or
before the several days hereinbefore mentioned for the payment
thereof, at the office of the company, in the city of Newark, or to
agents, when they produce receipts signed by the president or the
treasurer, then, and in every such case, the said company shall not
be liable to the payment of the sum insured, or any part thereof,
and this policy shall cease and determine."
The first premium was duly paid, but when the next premium
became due, on the 16th of July 1870, it was not paid. In the
following October, Dr. Day made application to the company for
the reinstatement of the policy, and the company consented to reinstate it upon the conditions and in the manner following:On the 1st of October 1870, Dr. Day paid the premium to the
agent of the company at Washington, and received a receipt for
the same. At the same time lie gave to the agent his certificate
of health, and the physician of the company signed his certificate
of examination, which were forwarded to the company at Newark,
New Jersey. The policy was renewed, and the renewal receipt
was sent by the company to its agent October 12th 1870. This
receipt was dated July 16th 1870, and was given to Day on the
14th of October. On the 22d day of January following Dr. Day
died.
Frederick T. _relinghuqysen and J. Hubley Ashton, for plaintiff inerror.
A. G. Riddle and Francis filler, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HUNT, J.-Eleven special pleas are interposed, to which it is not
necessary particularly to refer, as the questions to be decided arise
upon the rulings of the judge at the trial, made upon points not
connected with the pleadings. The chief subject of contention
arises upon the refusal of the judge to charge as requested by the
defendant in the following prayers:1. If the jury find from the evidence that the certificate of health
in evidence was made by Dr. Day, the insured, on or about the 1st
of October 1870, and by him delivered to the agent of the defendant, at Washington city, and by such agent sent to the principal
office of the defendant, at Newark, New Jersey, and that the
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receipt in evidence, dated July 16th 1870, was thereupon forwarded
from the main office of the defendant to its agent at Washington
city, and by him delivered to the insured on or about the 14th day
of October 1870, and that between the time when the said certificate was made and the time of the delivery of said receipt to the
insured, Dr. Day had had any derangement of health, and did not
disclose that fact to the agent of the defendant when the receipt
was handed to him by the agent, or before, they will render a verdict for the defendant upon the sixth plea.
2. On refusing to instruct the jury as prayed by defendant, as
follows : If the jury find from the evidence that when the certificate
in evidence, dated October 1st 1870, was given to the agent of the
defendant at Washington city, the latter was not authorized to and
did not assume to reinstate the policy in suit, but accepted the
premium and forwarded the certificate to his principal, and that
the receipt in evidence, dated July 16th 1870, was then in the
home office of the defendant, in New Jersey, and that said receipt
was forwarded to the agent of the defendant on or about the 12th
day of October 1870, and by him delivered to the insured on or
about the 14th day of the same month; and if the jury further
find that after the date of said certificate, and before the delivery
of said receipt to the insured, the insured had had any derangement
of health, or that at the time of the delivery of said receipt to him,
he was not in sound health, they should render a verdict for the
defendant.
The state of Dr. Day's health during the summer and autumn
of 1870 was the subject of contradictory testimony. The defendant gave evidence tending to prove that he was compelled by illhealth to give up his business as a teacher on the 18th of October 1870, that for several weeks prior to that time he was much
debilitated, and was conscious of that fact; that in November he
had the consumption, of which he died in January, and that lie
was in feeble and disordered health from the spring of 1869 until
his death. The plaintiff, on the other hand, gave evidence tending
to show that he was in sound health till the latter part of October
1870, and that he did jiot have the consumption until the month
of November 1870.
The exceptions we are to consider assume that on the 1st day
of October 1870, when he presented his certificate of health to
the agent at Washington, Dr. Day was in a condition of health
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that made im a satisfactory subject for the reinstatement or continuance of his policy of insmurance.
It is contended that between the time of thus making and presenting his certificate to the agent and the date (fourteen days later)
on which the agent delivered to him the receipt by which his insurance policy was continued in force until July 16th 1871, there
had been a change in his health which would have caused the rejection of his application to continue the policy had such change
been mad 'known to the company, and that the failure to make.
known such change was a fraud, which invalidated the policy thusrenewed or continued.
It is not contended that there were any false representations
made on the 14th of October, or any devices or contrivances to
deceive the company. No affirmative action on that occasion is.
complained of. The contention is that the representation made on.
the 14th of October was a continuing one, from the time it was.
made till the delivery of the renewal receipt on the 14th, and that.
if not true at the latter date, the contract was avoided.
In reaching a conclusion on this point, we may' notice; first,
that no inquiry was made of Day or demand for information as to.
his condition between the 1st and the 14th of October. The company was particular and specific in its inquiries as to his condition
on the first of the month, and required prescribed forms of evidence
as to that condition. There it stopped, and neither by expression
or by implication intimated a desire for later information.
It is to be observed, secondly, that the issuance made to him- oh,
the 14th of October relates back to the 16th of July in the same
year. The certificate reads:
"Policy No. 59,687, on the life of Richard H. B. Day, is hereby continued in force for one year from date (July 16th 1870),
settlement of the premium having been made as per margin."
The settlement in the margin showed the payment of $137.50,
being the amount of the premium of insurance for one year on the
sum of $5000, as stated in the original policy of insurance.
It will be observed, thirdly, that the distance between Washington
and Newark is about two hundred miles only, and that the certificates of Dr. Day's health and the application, which were forwarded by the agent to the company at Newark, would, in the
ordinary course of the mails, reach the office at Newark on the
morning or during the day of the 2d; that all the forms
VOL. XXVI.-46
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of the company to authorize a renewal were complied with, and
that the risk was such as the company would accept as a desirable
one, and that the receipt for the renewal was received in Washington on or about the 14th of October, and was on that day delivered to Dr. Day.
The prayer of the insurance company did not include a request
that the jury should determine, as a matter of fact, whether, upon
the evidence submitted, the representation was or was not a con
tinuous one; whether the contract was consummated on the 14th
of October, or by relation on the 1st of October; but the judge
was requested to charge, as a matter of law, that the representation
was a continuing one.
The facts referred to, we think, show that, although actually
completed on the 14th of October, the jury would have been warranted in finding that the contract was understood and intended by
the parties to take effect by relation as of the 1st of that month.
The money was paid to the agent at Washington on that day. The
insurance was post-dated, so as to include that day. The full
amount of the premium for one year was paid by the applicant,
viz., $187.50. The company cut off the insured from two and a
half months of his policy when they issued it on the 1st of October,
and dated it as of July 16th, although taking payment of the premium for a year.. We think that they did not necessarily intend
to cut off an additional fourteen days, but may have meant it to be
as of the date when the insured paid his money and presented a
risk that they were willing to take, and of the time that it would
have taken effect, if they had responded without a delay of two
weeks. Had it been otherwise, we cannot conceive how the sagacious business men who control this company would have assented
to the delivery of the policy without inquiry as to the intermediate
time. .More than three months elapsed before Day's death, monthly
returns being made by the agent, and the company must have(
known and assented to the delivery of the renewal receipt not only,
but to the fact that there had been no inquiry or information as to
Day's health after October 1st. The jury might account for it on
the theory that the whole contract was intended to be and was as
of October 1st, and that it spoke from that date.
There is every indication that Day thus relied upon that contract,
nor is there any reason to believe that he intended to deceive or to
conceal. Thecompany made inquiries to its own satisfaction, so
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far, in such direction, upon sich points, and within such periods as
it thought proper. It was not for him to advise the company
of wlat it should do, or to volunteer information which it did not
seek. lie paid his money, delivered his certificate, received the
renewal when the company chose to give it, found upon examinationi that it covered the whole period from the July preceding. He
lived in the same town with the agent, and received no suggestion
from him that anything further was expected, and was warranted
in assuming that his contract was intended to take effect from an
earlier period than its actual delivery. Ile probably died in the
honest belief that he had thus provided for his widow. It would
be far from good faith to his representatives, should it now be held
otherwise.
ln Colt v. The Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 54 N. Y. 597, it is said:
"Tle defendant must not be made liable where by the terms of the
contract it is fairly exempted, however harsh the result may appear;
nor can it be excused where the exemption is claimed upon a strict
and rigid interpretation of words without regard to the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the apparent intent of the
parties." See also Tipton v. Fertner, 20 N. Y. 423.
In May on Ins., sec. 190, it is laid down: "Where renewals are
made upon the statements in the original application, whether the
truth of the statements is to be tried by the circumstances existing
at the time of the renewal or at the time when the original application was made, is a question upon which the authorities do not
agree, some taking the view that a renewal makes a new contract,
and others that it merely continues the old one. Special circumstances, however, seem to control the decision, according as these
circumstances indicate the intent of the parties."
If we assume it to be true, as a general proposition, that the
policy speaks from the date of its issue, and that the obligation of
the applicant to make a full disclosure continues down to the completion of the contract, and that the occurrence of a material change
before the contract is consummated must be communicated to the
company, we do not advance essentially in the case before us. The
question recurs, when was the contract of Dr. Day consummated ?
If on the 14th of October, when the renewal receipt was delivered,
as the company contends, then the rule mentioned bars the plaintiff's right to recover. If, as the plaintiff contends, the contract
by the intention and understanding of the parties relates to the
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1st of October, when the premium was paid by the applicant, and
the certificate of health presented and transmitted, or to a point of
time within a few days thereafter, within which the company ought
to have examined and to have accepted a risk in all respects suitable to be accepted within its own rules, then the general rule
quoted is not applicable. The case is governed by different principles. It is not necessary, therefore, to question the principle
assumed in the authority quoted, or to examine the cases cited to
sustain it.
We are of the opinion that the exceptions to the charge of the
judge, upon the theory that the representations by Dr. Day were
made on the 14th day of October, or that concealment was then
practiced by him, on the ground that the previous representations,
necessarily and as a matter of law, were continuous, and that the
contract was consummated on that day, cannot be sustained. It
was a question proper under all the circumstances for the consideration of the jury. If they had found for the plaintiff, we are of
the opinion that the verdict would not have been vacated as being
without or against the evidence.
In many English companies a formal acceptance of the proposal
for insurance is issued. In some companies this acceptance is
unconditional, so that the premium be paid within the month, the
letter of acceptance running to the effect that the proposal has been
accepted, and that a receipt is ready at the office for the premium,
upon the payment of which the assurance will commence, but that
if the same be not paid within thirty days a reappearance and fresh
certificate will be required. In other companies the acceptance is
qualified by the condition not only that the insurance shall not commence till the payment of the premium, but that no material change
shall have occurred prior thereto: Bunyon, p. 58, cited in Bliss,
sect. 99.
The practice is not uniform, and there is nothing remarkable in
allowing a certificate of health to stand good for thirty days, no
reappearance or examination for that interval being required.
Among the cases relating to this subject the following may be
referred to as showing the effect of the contract by relation, and
that the consummation of the contract does not necessarily depend
upon the delivery of the policy.
In Lightbody v. N7. Am. Ins. Co., 23 Wend. 24, it was held
that a policy bearing date on the day the premium is paid takes
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effect by relation from that day, although the policy be not delivered
for several days afterwards. In this case the buildings were burned
on the day after the premium was paid, and before the policy was
delivered.
In Perkins v. Wash. Ins. Co., 4 Cowen 465, the rule was applied in a case where the agent was authorized to make insurances,
"provided the office shall recognise the rate of premium and be
otherwise satisfied with the risks," it was held that the company
was bound to issue a policy where the insurance was a proper one
and the premium was paid or tendered, although before the premium
was received at the home office the property was consumed by fire.
In 09iase v. Hamilton Ins. Co., 22 Barb. 527, the agent forwarded a proposition for insurance, which was altered by the. company, and the alteration communicated to and accepted by the
applicant, and the premium paid to the agent. Held, that the
company was bound to issue its policy and was liable for the loss.
In -Insurance Co. v. Webster, 6 Wall. 129, the party having
received his policy, it was held that he was not affected by afterwards signing a memorandum that the insurance was to "take
effect when approved by E. D. P., general agent." See, also,
Cooper v. P'aeific Mi. L. Ins. Co., 3 Big. Ins. R. 656; 7 Nevada
616; Carpenter v. L S. Ins. Co., 4 Sand. Ch. 408; Am. Horse
ins. Co. v.:Patterson, 28 Ind. 17; Bliss sect. 172; City of Davenport v. Peoria ial -F., 17 Iowa 276; Lefavour v. Ins. Co.,
1 Philadelphia 558.
Second objection. At the close of his charge, the judge instructed the jury as follows: " That the plaintiff is not responsible
for or in any way affected by, any of the statements in Dr. White's
affidavit, unless the jury find that before and at the time of filing
it with the agent of the company, she had actual knowledge of its
contents, and adopted and used them, as her own declarations.
That affidavit is her declaration or not, as she knew and was advised of it, and procured and approved it." To which instruction
the counsel for the insurance company then and there excepted.
In establishing her case at the trial, the plaintiff was bound to
prove that notice of the death of her husband, Dr. Day, had been
given to the company, and that a demand of payment of the
amount claimed, had been made. For that purpose only, she
offered in evidence the proofs of loss, which had been furnished to
the company, except the affidavit of Dr. White, forming a part
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of the same, which she did not offer in evidence. Those proofs
contained the sworn statement of Mrs. Day herself, the sworn
statement of Dr. Isaac White, certificates of the clergyman and
undertaker, and proof of identity by J.F. Patterson.
These affidavits were all on one paper, and the court required
that the proofs of loss should be put in as an entirety, that is, that
all the papers containing the preliminary proofs should be put in
evidence, and the same were thereupon put in evidence by the plaintiff, including the affidavit of Dr. White. In Dr. White's affidavit,
thus introduced, occurred the following questions and answers.
"How long have you known the deceased ? I have known Dr. R.
H. B. Day seventeen years. How long was deceased sick ? About
five months. Date of your first visit? November 28th 1870.
Date of your last? January 22d 1871. Of what disease did he
die? Pulmonary consumption." It appeared further that Dr.
White was not a resident of Washington, but left that city immediately after making the affidavit mentioned, on the 28th of
January 1871.
Mrs. Day testified that Dr. White had not seen her husband
between September 1869, and the latter part of November 1870.
The struggle as to Dr. White's affidavit and the ruling upon it
are quite immaterial. He stated in answer to one of the questions
that Dr. Day had been ill about five months, and as he died on the
22d of January, 1871, this would carry his illness back to the 22d
of August 1870, of course including all the month of October of
that year. The insurance company apparently sought the benefit
of this evidence on the contest in regard to Day's health.
It is, however, manifest that White's statement was not one of
personal knowledge, but was upon rumor, or made without sufficient
reflection. This is evident both from the testimony of Mrs. Day,
.which'is entirely unimpeached and uncontradicted, that Dr. White
did not see her husband during all the year 1870 until the latter
part of November. Upon this subject she could not well be in
error. It was equally evident from the statement of White himself that his first visit to Day was on the 28th of November 1870.
Day's bodily health on the 1st day of October 1870 was satisfactory to the company, and the attempt was to show an unfavorable
alteration between that date and the 14th of the same m6nth. But
White had not seen him during those fourteen days, nor for months
before, nor for more than six weeks afterwards.
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Whether the presentation of the affidavit of White by Mrs. Day
made its contents evidence, whether she knew its contents or not,
whether she did or did not adopt or procure it, was not of the slighteat consequence. The .paper contained nothing that was legal evidence upon the point in issue, and a verdict founded upon it could
not have been sustained. The disposition of the subject by the
judge was one that could not possibly work legal injury to the
insurance company. There was, therefore, no error: Starbird v.
Barrows, 43 N. Y. 200; Pepin v. Lachenmeb'er, 45 Id. 27;
People v. Brandeth, 86 Id. 191 ; Porterv. Buckman, 38 Id. 211;
Corning v. Toy Iron and Nail Works, 44 Id. 577.
The effect of facts set forth in preliminary proof as admissions is
discussed in Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32. Where an
agent of the insurance company stated that the proofs were sufficient
to show the death of the insured but that they showed that he committed suicide, it was held that the whole admission must be taken
together. Where the party or her agent stated in the preliminary
proofs that the deceased had committed suicide, furnishing the verdict of a coroner's jury to that effect, and where the narration of
the manner of the death of the deceased was so interwoven with the
death of the deceased that the two things were inseparable, it was
held that the whole was competent to go before the jury.
We see no occasion to question the positions of that case.
Upon the whole case we are all of the opinion that the judgment
must be affirmed.
The question of the effect and the
duration of representations, made in the
course of negotiations for insurance,
which arises in the principal case is one
of considerable interest and importance.
From the nature of the contract of insurance, it would seem the insured in
giving to the insurer the information
upon which the latter bases his undertaking to hold the former harmless in a
certain event, or to compensate his loss
to himself or to his family to the extent
agreed upon, should act with the utmost
candor and frankness. Otherwise an
insurance contract degenerates from an
agreement for a fair indemnity, to the
level of a transaction between sharpers.
In Dalglish v. Jarvie,2 McN. & Gordon

243, RoPiE, Id. Com., said: "In cases
of insurance a party is required not only
to state all matters within his knowledge, which he believes to be material
to the question of insurance, but all
which in point of fact are so. If he
conceals anything that he knows to be
material it is a fraud ; but besides that
if he conceals anything that -may influence the rate of premium which the underwriter may require, although he does
not know that it would have that effect
such concealment entirely vitiates the
policy." This statement, although obiter, as Dalglish v. Jarvie was not a case
of insurance, and although at first blush
it seems to press a little severely upon
the insured, will on consideration be
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seen to fairly express the law of the wcards v. Footner, 1 Camp. 530 (1808),
subject. The contract on the part of
in a conversation before the policy was
the insurer is the result of a careful cal- signed, the broker stated that the vessel
culation of the doctrines of chances ; to represented by him was to sail with
arrive at this result he is entitled to convoy and to carry ten guns and twenknow all the factors which should enter ty-five men. No particular mention
into the calculation in each particular
was made of her force at the time of the
case; if then any factor which should execution of the policy nor was the
be known, is suppressed, no matter how statement embodied therein. She sailed
innocently, by the insured, provided it with eight guns and seventeen men.
is within his knowledge, he cannot com- On the trial, Lord ELLaBOROUGH
plain if the entire bargain is declared said : " But here there is no evidence
void; it is merely an application of the of any conversation upon this subject
familiar principle that where, of two between the parties subsequently to the
equally innocent persons, one by his statement that the ship was to carry ten
negligence or otherwise causes a loss, guns and twenty-five men, and this havthat loss should be borne by the person ing taken place when the insurance was
giving the occasion for it, no matter how talked of, and the terms of it were agreed
free from the possibility of moral re- upon, it must be referred to the policy
proach his conduct may be. Accord- and treated as a representation which
ingly it is held that the concealment, of
required to be substantially complied
which the insurer has a right to com- with on the part of the assured."
plain, need not be wilful, i. e. a wilful
The question was very carefully conact of deception by concealment : Brit- sidered in the case of Traill v. Barney,
ish Equitable Ins. Co. v. Great Western 4 Giff. 485 (1864). One Mrs. Taylor
.R. JT' Co., 38 L. J. R. 132 (1868);
was insured in the Provident Clerks
Vose v. Eagle Life ,- Health Ins. Co., 6 Mutual Life Assurance Association (the
Cush. 42; and where an untrue repre- defendant), which proposed to re-insure
sentation has been made, though made Mrs. Taylor with the plaintiff's associainnocently, if the person so representing tion. Accordingly the secretary of the
afterwards becomes aware of the un- Provident Clerks, on May 10th 1861,
truth, lie must not allow the other party called on the plaintiff and made the proto go on and consummate the contract position to it, stating that the Victoria
under the impression of its truth, and office had agreed to take a part of the
if he does so, the act of suffering the risk and that the defendant would itself
other party to continue in error will retain 10001. thereof. Relying on this
taint the whole transaction with fraud : statement, the plaintiff accepted the risk,
Reynell v. Sprye, 1 De G., M. & G. and, on May 18th 1861, the defendant
660 (1852).
paid the proper amount of premium to
This duty to correct any misapprehen- the plaintiff. After the death of Mrs.
sion arising from negligent representa- Taylor the plaintiff discovered that the
tion and to communicate anything defendant had re-insured all its remainwhich, during the negotiation, comes to ing risk in the Victoria, and filed a bill
the knowledge of the one party, which to cancel the policy. It was proved that
might affect the conduct of the other in at the time of the representation, the
making the bargain, lasts up to the act- Victoria had offered to take 10001. riskual making of the contract, and a failure or more on Mrs. Taylor, but that the
so to communicate will vitiate it. This defendants had only intended to give up
has been held from very early times in 10001. and to keep the remaining risk
the history of insurance law. In Ed- itself, and that on the 15th of May,
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before the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant was complete, the defendant changed its mind and the entire
risk was got rid of, of which fact the
defendant did not inform the plaintiff.
STUART, V. C., said: "The offer and
acceptance upon that representation
took place upon the loth of May, but
policy was not then made, the contile
tract was not then completed, nor was
any premium paid by the defendant's
association until eight days after the representations were made and the offer
accepted. But in the meantime ** *
the directors of the defendant's association made up their minds not to retain
any portion of the risk, * * * it was

upon the 15th of May, before the policy
was signed that the change of intention
took place. It was not merely a change
of intention, but the transfer was then
actually effectuated. The defendants
retained no liability whatever. There
was therefore a representation made
which was material as an inducement to
the plaintiff's society to enter into the
contract at the time when the contract was
perfected that was no longer a true representation." There was a decree that
the policy should be cancelled. This was
affirmed on appeal, 10 Lai Times R.
N. S. 215, TuNER, L. J. saying, "I

take it to be clear that if a person makes
a representation, by which he induces
another to take a particular course, and
the circumstances are afterwards altered
to the knowledge of the party by whom
the representation was made and are so
altered that the alteration may affect the
course of conduct, which may be pursued by the party to whom the representation was made, it is the imperative
duty of the party to communicate to
the party to whom he has made it the
alteration of these circumstances."
In the British Equitable Ins. Co. v.
The Great 11estern .Railway Co., 38 L.
J. R. 132, B., in order to effect an insurance on his life, was required to sign
a declaration with reference to his habVOL. XXVI--47

its of life and health, and to state his
latest, if other than his usual, medical
attendant, lie signed the declaration,
and gave a certiticate of his health by
his usual medical attendant, in July
1868. Notice of acceptance by the company was sent August 19th, informing
him that the premium was payable on
or before September 9th; that until
payment the company would not be liable, and that any alteration in his
health in the interim would invalidate
the policy, unless the same were disclosed to the manager of the company.
On September 8th, the premium was
paid and a policy delivered, containing
the condition that any alteration in
health since the medical examination
would avoid the policy. On the 17th
of August (before notice of acceptance),
B. had consulted a physician, other than
his usual one, and had been informed
by him that he had Bright's disease ;
this he did not communicate to the company. He afterwards died and an action was brought by the Great Western
Railway Company, assignee of the policy. A bill was filed to restrain the action. MALINS, V. C., granted the
injunction, holding that while the inquiries as to health had been truly, i. e.
honestly, answered by the insured, yet
having signed the declaration with reference to the latest medical attendant,
that became a continuing declaration up
to the time of the payment of the premium, which had been fixed by the parties
as the time of the conclusion of the contract, and hence B. was bound to have
informed the company of his having
consulted the second physician. This
was affirmed on appeal, 20 Law Times
R. 422.
The same doctrine has been very well
expressed on this side of the Atlantic.
In Whitley v. Piedmont 6- Arlington Life
Ins. Co., 71 N. C. 480 (1874), RoDMAN, J., said, "No rule seems better
settled than that upon a contract of insurance, it is the duty of the assured at
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or before the making of the contract to
eommunicate all facts within his knowledge which may atfect the risk: 1 Phil.
524 ; May Ins., p. 200. This
Ins.
dut" cannot be the less obligatory because the assured has shortly before
represented or warranted a fact to be
true, which then was true but has since
ceased to be so. In such case the insurer naturally and rightfully infers
that the thing continues in the same
condition as far as the assured knows."
The continuance of the representation
will then last up to the conclusion of
the contract ; the duty of the applicaut
for insurance by no means ends with his
application and the statements contained
therein; they constitute a mere proposal :
Schwartz v. Gernunia Life Ins. Co., 18
11inn. 448 (1872); but the obligation
to communicate any change of circumstances does not continue beyond the
time of an actual making of the contract
and, therefore, when the insurer has become legally or equitably bound to issue a policy, anything thereafter occurring need not be communicated by the
assured.
In Cory etal. v. Patton, Law Rep. 7
Q. B. 304 (1872), which was an action
on a marine policy, the defendant
pleaded that at the time of making the
policy the plaintiffs concealed a fact
then known to them, the knowledge of
which would have affected the conduct
of the defendant in taking the risk.
The plaintiffs replied that before they
had knowledge of the said fact, being at
a distance from the defendant, they had,
by letter, directed their agent to effect
the insurance; that the plaintiffs had no
knowledge of the said fact until after a
reasonable time for the agent to effect
the insurance had elapsed, and that before the plaintiffs knew the fact, the
agent did apply to the underwriter and
settled and agreed on the terms of the
insurance, and the defendant made a
parol agreement whereby he became
bound, in conscience and good faith

though not in law to subscribe a policy,
and that the plaintiffs, knowing at the
time the fact was learned by them, that
the defendants by that time would either
have effected the insurance or would be
in honor bound to insure abstained
from communicating the fact, in good
faith. To this the defendant demurred,
and on the demurrer judgment was
I
given for the plaintiffs.
BLACXBURX, J., said: "It is quite
clear that "there is no obligation to disclose any matter which first comes to
the knowledge of the assured after the
policy is made, and one cannot doubt
that if there was a complete contract to
execute a policy enforceable in equity
* * * the court of equity would compel the party to execute the policy as
of the date when he was bound to have
executed it, notwithstanding any intervening facts, on the principle that in
equity the thing is considered as done
when it ought to have been done. The
non-disclosure of the fact after the
policy was made, in equity could have
no more effect than a similar non-disclosure after it was made in law. The
present is an intermediate case and the
question which must now be determined
seems to us to be, whether, after the
negotiation is complete and the contract made in good faith and the underwriter is under a moral obligation to
execute a formal policy, the assured is
bound by good faith to give information
to the assurer of a matter which would
make him aware that his bargain was a
bad one, information which ought to
have no effect upon him, but would expose him to temptation to break his contract, which as far as the law is concerned
he may do with impunity, because for
fiscal purposes the legislature has forbidden the court, either of law or equity,
to enforce the contract." See also Lishman et al. v. Northern Marine Ins. Co.,
28 Law Times N. S. 168 (1873) ; Rzchard v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 31 Mo.
518.
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It may then be summed up as the law signed, LOWRIE, J., said, " We inof the question that until a contract of in- cline also to the opinion that. notwithsurance is made, the assured or applicant standing the express terms of the policy,
for insurance is bound to communicate the countersigning by the agent i, not
to the insurer anything, and more es- under all circumstances essential. On
pecially any change in the circumstances an equitable interpretation of the whole
as they stood at the time of the applica- transaction it may become the duty of
the court to dispense with a plrion of
tion, which may affect the conduct of
the insurer with reference to the insur- the forms of contract if it cal ind any
ance, but that this duty ceases the mo- reliable substitute for them, oil
the prinment the insurer becomes bound in law, ciple that cures defective execution of
equity or good Mporals to carry out the powers where the intention to exceuto
contract and deliver a policy, even is sufficiently plain."
In this case,
though the information if given would however, it was held that the delivery
enable the insurer to avail himself of a was a conditional and not a final one;
technical objection and thus get rid of a and from it, and other cases, may be
bad bargain.
W1Vhen the contract is drawn the rule that the contract of inreally though not formally made will, surance is in fieri while anything reit would seem, depend very much on tile mains 1open for dispute or treaty,"' or
peculiar circumstances of each case, af- anything is to be done by the assured ;
fected by the usual course of dealing except perhaps where the thing to be
about the subject-matter, and perhaps done is the payment of money, which
by that of the parties to the case. The payment has been fixed at a day future
delivery of a formal paper, as a policy, by the terms of tie contract and a prior
is certainly not in all cases necessary:
date has been fixed for the commenceXenos v.
iVckham, Law Rep. 2 E. & I. ment of the risk. See also Schwartz v.
App. 296 (1868) ; Lishman v. Northern
'ertnania Life Ins. Co., 18 Minn. 448.
31. Ins. Co., supra; see also Morrison So that the question of the conclusion of
v. Universal M.1Ins. Go., 27 Law Times the contract resolves itself to that of the
R. N. S. 791 (1873) ; nor a receipt intention of the parties, and it would
formally countersigned by the agent, seem is generally to be decided by the
though expressly required by the policy. jury, though there may arise some cases
In Jfgers v. Keystone Mutu'al Life Ins. in which it should be passed upon by
Co., 9 Casey 268, where the policy ex- the court.
pressly required a countersigning by
H. BUDD, JR.
the agent, but was delivered uncounter-

Court of Common Plea8, _No. 2, of Philadelphia.
BURRILL v. HEVNER.
State insolvent laws having for their object the release of a debtor from imprisomnent, or even distribution of his assets, but not the discharge of his debts,
are not superseded by the Bankrupt Act of Congress.
The Pennsylvania Act of 1842, for the arrest of fraudulent debtors, is in force,
and although proceedings in bankruptcy will lie for the same causes, yet the courts
will enforce the Act until proceedings in bankruptcy are actually commenced.

THim was a warrant of arrest under the Act of 12th July 1842,
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which provides that a defendant may be arrested, either before or
after judgment, on a warrant to be issued by a judge of the court,
on affidavits showing either that the debt was fraudulently contracted
or that the defendant is fraudulently concealing or removing his
property with intent to defraud his creditors. The act further
provides for a hearing before the judge issuing the warrant, and
testimony on both sides, and if the facts set out in the complaint
are established to the satisfaction of the judge he shall require the
defendant to give security to pay. the debt or to take the benefit of
the insolvent law (Act of 16th June 1836). In default of giving
such bond lie shall be committed to jail, from which, however, he
shall be released at any time by complying with the provisions of
the insolverit law.
The petition and affidavits in the present case set out that the
defendant, being largely in debt to petitioner and others, was secretly
converting his property into money for less than its value, with
intent to fraudulently remove from the state.
T

.Ljnd and Ashhur8t, for the plaintiff.

-Hanson,for defendant, resisted the application in the first instance upon the ground that the Act of 1842 was not in force,
being superseded by the Bankrupt Act of Cohgress. He relied
principally on Commonwealth ex rel. v. O'Hara,6 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 765.
HARE, P. J., expressed the opinion that the Act of 1842 is an insolvefit, not a bankruptcy Act, as it does not discharge the debt, b'ut
merely provides a remedy against fraudulent debt; that the Bankrupt Act was not intended and should not be construed to supersede the action of state courts under Insolvent Acts, except in cases
where the bankruptcy jurisdiction is actually invoked; and that
although in the case before him the frauds complained of in the plaintiff's affidavit might have been made the subject of an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy, yet this was no objection to the defendanht
being committed under the Warrant of Arrest Act for these frauds.
It is rather remarkable that so much
doubt should have arisen and that there
should have been so much conflict of decision on a matter which on principle
would seem quite clear. Nevertheless,

the general tendency of decision not only
by the district courts in bankruptcy,
but by many state tribunals, seemed at
first to set strongly towards holding all
the state laws as well for the arrest of
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the debtor as for his discharge from imprisonment to be superseded by the
Bankrupt Act of 1867. This construction was the more remarkable as several
well-known cases, under the former
Bankrupt Act of 1841, had put the matter in a very clear light, and shown the
distinction between bankrupt and insolvent laws. Thus Berthdon v. Betts, 4
Hill 577, had settled the law in New
York, and in fact the courts of New
York do not seem to have hesitated in
upholding their continued jurisdiction
in these cases.
In re Ziegenfuss, 2 Ired. 463, is a carefully considered decision under the Act
of 1841. It was a case of an application for a writ of habeas corpus fordischarge from arrest on a capias. the
main ground relied upon by counsel for
the applicant was that upon filing a petition in bapkruptcy, a jutisdiction was
acquired over the person and property
of the petitioner, which was inconsistent
with the jurisdiction of the state courts
under the insolvent laws and which
necessarily superseded them. Judge
BATTLE, in his opinion, says, "Ido not
deny that to a certain extent the objects
of the insolvent laws of this state and
the Bankrupt Law of the.United States,
namely, the, equal distribution of'the
debtor's property pro rata among all his
creditors, and the exemption o his body
from imprisonment, are the same, yet in
some respects there are essential differences between them, particularly in this,
that the latter goes much farther than
the former, inasmuch as it entirely discharges the debts themselves, while the
former only releases the body. It is
to be borne in mind that the Bankrupt
Law nowhere expressly repeals the insolvent laws of the state ; so far as the
state insolvent laws may prevent or impede the operation of the Bankrupt Law
they must yield to it in order that it
may fully accomplish its object of
establishing a uniform system of
bankruptcy throughout the United
States; but while the state laws thus
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yield, they are not entirely abrogated.
They exist and operate with full vigor until the Bankrupt Law attaches
upon the person and property of the
bankrupt, and that is not until it is judicially ascertained that the petitioner is
a person entitled to the benefits of the
Bankrupt Law by being declared a
bankrupt by decree of the court ; before
that time, .I think, upon a sound construction of the Bankrupt Act, it does
not necessarily come in conflict with
the insolvent laws of the state."
The decision in Ex purte Eavias, 2
Story 322, was not really inconsistent
with this decision, as above mentioned,
for the Massachusetts statute there in
question was really a bankrupt law, discharging the debt as well as the body
of the debtor. And in Philadelphia,
under the Act of 1841, the decision
of the United States District Court in
Sullivan v. Hieskell, Crabbe 525, s.c.
4 P. L. J. 171, where Judge STORY'S
decision in Ex parte Eumcs was cited
and considered, and Judge RANDALL
arrived at an opposite conclusion as to
the Insolvent Law of Pennsylvania, for
the sound reason that while the Massachusetts statute discharged tle debt, the
Pennsylvania Act of 1836 only relieved the debtor from imprisonment.
And the Supreme Court of Penna., in
Nesbit v. Greaves, 6 W. & S. 120, had
held that an application and discharge
in bankruptcy would excuse a compliance with the condition of a bond to
take the benefit of the Insolvent Law.
But on the passage of the Bankrupt
Act of 1867, there seems to have
been a singular tendency at first,
even stronger with the state than the
federal courts,.4o carry its application
in every respect to the widest limits,
and while so extending to the utmost
the range of the statute and the special
jurisdiction established by it, to narrow
correspondingly the ordinary jurisdiction of the state courts, and the common remedies and method of legal redress: Commonwealth v. O'Hara, 6 Am.
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Law Iteg. N. S. 765: l'errJ v. Langley, 7 Am. Law Reg. 429; 'an Nostraud v. Carr, 2 Bankr. Reg. 485 ;
.Martin Y. Berry, 37 Cal. 208 ; Corner
v. Miller, I Bankr. Reg. 403; In re
Reynolds, 8 R. I. 485; Shephardson's
App, al from Probate, 36 Conn. 23
C s.qard v. Kroner, 4 Bankr. Reg. 569;
In re lndelmndent Ins. Co., 6 Id. 260;
it re Reiman, 11 Id. 38; Watson v.
nle. Citizns' Savings Bank, Id. 162;
Laender v. Gosnll, 12 Id. 284.
This series of decisions is quite paralleled by those which decided that the
mere non-resistance of a debtor to his
creditor's getting judgment, which lie
could not prevent except by a false and
vexatious dcfence or by filing a voluntary petition, was an act of bankruptcy. So far had this doctrine gone
that it looked as if all the ordinary
modes of collecting debts would have
to be laid aside. The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, has decided the law to be otherwise in Wilson
v. Bank, 17 Wallace 473. Mr. Justice
MILLER says, in delivering the opinion
of the court: " We do not construe the
act as intended to cover all cases
of insolvency to the exclusion of other
judicial proceedings."
And the state courts have of course
followed what Judge SHARSWOOD,

in

Kenanerer v. Tool, 28 P. F. Smith 151,
speaks of as "the wise, liberal and
reasonable construction of the Bankrupt Act in support of the rights of
bona fide
creditors," given by the Supreme Court of the United States in
that case.
Similarly with regard to assignments
for the benefit of creditors, it was quite
the general opinion at one time that they
were absolutely void as in contravention
of the Bankrupt Law. The Circuit
Court of the Pennsylvania district never
went beyond holding, however, that such
assignments were voidable, if assailed
within the time limited by the Bankrupt
Law, by the assignee in bankruptcy, and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in

Beck v. Parker, 15 P. F. Smith 262,
maintained the validity of such assignments as being valid at common law,
irrespective of statute, although the
statute provides for a distribution of the
trust funds. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in the recent case of
Meyer v. ElI1man, 1 Otto 502, fully confirmed the view that such assignments
for benefit of creditors are not void, but
at the utmost voidable only ; and Air.
Justice FIELD, in the expression of his
opinion, seems strongly to incline towards the decision of Justice NELSON in
Sedgewirc v. Place, I Nat. Bk. R. 673,
and Justice SwAYNeE in Langly v. Perry,
2 Id. 596, and Judge SstARswoon'S
expression of opinion in Beck v.Parker,
15 P. F. Smith 262, in favor of the absolute validity of such assignments for
creditors, notwithstanding the adjudication in bankruptcy.
The amendments to the Bankrupt Law
have also so much restrained the field
of its operation, as well by shortening
the period in which the various grounds
of involuntary proceedings must be
taken advantage of by petition, as by
requiring the joinder of a large proportion of creditors to maintain a petition,
that practically involuntary proceedings
are no longer available in ordinary cases
as a mode for collecting debts. Thus
the tendency both of legislation and
judicial construction has been to bring
the law back again to what had been
settled under the old act.
The case of Campbell v. THarmer (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Jan. 1867,
40) is important in this connection, and
it is unfortunate it was never reported,
as it might have served to counteract
the injurious effect of Judge WILLIAMs'S
hasty decision in Commonwealth v.
O'Hara. In that case Judge SHAnSWOOD had in 1867 granted a warrant
of arrest, and after argument refused to
quash it even on the ground of a petition
in bankruptcy being filed, but held the
warrant until Harmer had been by the
District Court of the Uniteil States for
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Eastern District Pennsylvania, adjudicated a bankrupt on the ground of having
submitted to arrest for more than seven
days, and only on such adjudication had
ordered his discharge from the warrant
on the ground of the case having then
fallen under the federal jurisdiction.
This was in harmony with In re Ziegenfuss, above cited, and with the decision
of the Supreme Court of Iowa, Reed v.
Tayler, 37 Iowa 209, made about the
same time, and Shears v. Solhinger, 10
Abt. Pr. N. S. 287 ; .x parte Jacobs,
12 Id. 273. In fact the clause in the
Bankrupt Law providing that the submission of the debtor to imprisonment
shall be an act of bankruptcy, is in
itself a strong argument that imprisonment for debt under the state laws is
not superseded.
The inconvenience resulting from
holding the laws for arrest of fraudulent debtors to be superseded, has been
felt with especial severity since the narrowing of the remedial sections of the
Bankrupt Law for adverse proceedings
by recent amendments, and it is gratifying that the law seems to be now
getting pretty well settled in accordance
with the old and sounder view.
A very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,
Geery's .Appeal, 43 Conn. 288, has settled the law in that state.
Steelman v. Mattix, 36 N. J. 344,
may be referred to as a valuable expositive of the law on this subject; the
sound distinction is there enforced, that
if the object of the statute is distribution of property among the creditors,
there may be ground for it being treated
as a state bankrupt act, and therefore
superseded by federal legislation ; but
if the object of the statute is the release
of the debtor from imprisonment and
the debt is not discharged, the distribution of the property among creditors is
to be viewed as incidental merely, and
the statute is not superseded.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in Scu'ly v. ti'irkpatrick, 29 P. F. Smith

324, held tile Act of 1842 as to arrest,
to be in full force in a case where the
debt had been fraudulently contracted,
and besides the principal case, the courts
of Common Plcas, Nos. 1 and 3, of
Philadelphia have, in the cases of Bales
v. Rowley, 33 Leg. Int. 202, and Bd
v. iilsen, 34 Id. 20, held the proceedings by arrest valid even in cases of concealment of property.
A possible difficulty which has been
suggested that a debtor having been compelled to give bond to take tile benefit
of the insolvent laws might be prevented from doing so by an adjudication in bankruptcy on the prayer of the
other creditors, is obviated by the liberal
and enlightened decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in Barber v.
Rodgers, 21 P. F. Smith 362, that the
condition of a bond given for discharge
from arrest to take the benefit of the
insolvent laws will be satisfied by a
petition, adjudication and discharge in
bankruptcy. There is thus no difficulty
in reducing the theory and practice in
cases of arrest to a harmonious system.
The whole machinery of the state law
for arrest and for discharge remains unimpaired and in full force, unless and
until the case is drawn within the superior jurisdiction of the federal courts by
appropriate proceedings. Until this is
done it is not for the state courts to refuse justice under the state laws or to
assume that the case is one which either
can fall within the federal jurisdiction if
invoked, or that the higher jurisdiction
will be invoked by any one.
If any party interested desires the relief of the bankrupt laws, the federal
courts are open, and where adjudication
has taken place, the state courts will
release their grasp. The debtor can,
without difficulty, transfer the cause
into bankruptcy, since there has been no
restriction ofvoluntary bankruptcy, and
the condition of his bond will be satisfied whether he or his other creditors
bring about the adjudication.
J. F. L.
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THE NEW JERSEY ZINC COMPANY v. CHARLES W. TROTTER
WILLIAM DIXSON AND DANIEL P. MAPES.
Suit brought by a New Jersey corporation, in the Court of Chancery of that
state, against three defendants, two of whom were residents of New Jersey and
one a resident of New York. The two former filed an answer, disclaiming all
interest in the questions involved in the suit. The latter answered to the merits,
and presented in due time to the Court of Chancery a petition, praying for the

removal of the suit into the Circuit Court of the United States for the District
of New Jersey. On motion to remand, it was held, (1) that the legislation
of March 3d 1875, in reference to the removal of causes, did not repeal the second
and third subdivisions of section 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States ;
(2) that the controversy between the plaintiff and the petitioning defendant could
be fully determined without the presence of the other parties to the suit; (3) that
the controversy as to them was removable under the provisions of the second subdivision of section 639, and that the motion to remand, as to the petitioning
defendant, must be refused.

Tis was a motion to remand to the state court the controversy
pending between The New Jersey Zinc Company, a corporation
created by the laws of New Jersey, and Charles W. Trotter, a
citizen of the state of New York.
The complainant filed its bill in the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey, on the 22d of January 1877, against Trotter and one William Dixson and Daniel P. Mapes, for an injunction to restrain
them from digging, mining and carrying away or using any of the
zintc ores, or other ores, found upon certain described premises, on
Mine Hill, in the county of Sussex, New Jersey, except Franklinite
and iron ores, when they exist separate from zinc ore, and to
account for all the ores which had already come into their hands.
The bill alleged that Dixson and Trotter were engaged in business as partners, and that the other defendant, Mapes, acting or
claiming to act under the authority of the firm, had entered upon a
portion of the premises and excavated and removed therefrom a
considerable quantity of the ores.
Answers were severally filed by the defendants: the said Dixson
acknowledging that he was the partner of Trotter in other matters,
but disclaiming all interest in the pending controversy, and denying that he ever authorized Mapes to mine, dr remove any of said
ores, or that he now claims or ever claimed any right, property or
interest .therein: the said Mapes setting up, that in entering upon
the premises and mining the ores, he was simply acting by the
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command and under the authority of his emnlloyer, Trotter, disclaiming all pretence of right to perfbrm such acts, except as the
agent and servant of Trotter; and the said Trotter, replying upon
the merits, claiming that he was solely interested in the premises,
as the lessee of one James L. Curtis, the surviving trustee of the
Franklinite Mining Company; that he employed Mapes to enter,
mine and carry away the ores, as lie had the right and authority to.
do, under the provisions of a certain lease fbr said premises, from
the trustee, duly executed March 6th 1877.
Upon the filing of the bill the state court granted a preliminary
order, restraining the defendants from carrying away, or otherwise
disposing of, any of the ores, then mined or thereafter to be iuined,
upon the premises, except Franklinite and iron ores, when they
exist separate from the zinc ore.
In this state of the pleadings, the defendant, Trotter, on the 31st
of August 1877, filed in the state court a petition, praying for the
removal of the cause to this court. ie set forth, in the petition,
that complainant was a citizen of the state of New Jersey, and the
petitioner a citizen of iNew York, and that the whole controversy
in the suit was wholly between citizens of different states; that although Mapes & Dixson were joined in tile bill of complaint,
as defendants with the petitioner, yet, in fact, neither of them had.
any interest in said controversy; that the same was between the
complainant and petitioner and could be fully determined between
them, without the presence of the other defendants; and further,.
that he had annexed thereto and filed therewith, an affidavit, that
he had reason to believe and did believe, that from prejudice and.
local influence, he would not be able to obtain justice in the statecourt. Not, as was explained upon the argument, from any lack
of confidence in the integrity or ability of the chancellor, but because he would feel obliged to follow the decision of the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in the case of The New Jersey
Zinc Go. v. The Boston Franklinite Co,, 2 McC. 418, which was
supposed to be against the claims of the defendant in this case.
Thomas N. McCarter, for petitioner.
John E. Parsons,for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NIXON, District Judge.-The counsel for respondent insists that
the.case should be remanded, because the Act of March 3d 1875
VoL. XXVI.-48
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(18 stat. 470) has repealed all antecedent legislation in regard to
the removal of causes, and because the present controversy does not
fall within the provisions of the said act.
The counsel for the petitioner claims that only such portions of
the Acts of 1866 and 1867 as are in conflict with the law of 1875,
are repealed by it; that the second and third subdivisions of sect.
639 of the Revised Statutes are still in force, and that the pending
suit conies within both of these subdivisions; or, if he is mistaken
with regard to the existence of that law, he is, nevertheless, entitled
to the removal under the second and third sections of the Act of
March 3d 1875.
In order to understand the present state of the law in the matter
of the removal of causes from the state to the national courts, it may
be proper to advert briefly to the previous legislation upon the subject. Whilst the judicial power of the United States is vested, by
the provisions of the 3d art. of the Constitution of the United States
in one Supreme Court, and in inferior courts, it is left to Congress
to say, from time to time, what inferior courts shall be ordained
and established. When the Congress acts, and clothes these subordinate tribunals with jurisdiction, the extent of the jurisdiction
-within the range of the constitutional authority to act, as limited
by the 2d sect. of the 3d art.-is wholly determined by the congressional will. Until within a few years, all the general legislation
upon the subject is found in the 12th sect. of the Judiciary Act. It
is here that the class of cases is defined in which the power of removal
exists, and the circumstances are found under which such removal
may be effected. The amount in dispute must be 500; the suit must
be commenced in the state court, against an alien, or by the citizen
of the state in which the suit is brought, against the citizen of another state; and the petition for removal must come from the defendant or defendants, and be filed in the state court at the time of entering an appearance to the action.
Under these provisions, it was early decided, that the right of
removal existed only with the defendant; that where there was
more than one, all must join in the petition, and to authorize the
removal, that all the plaintiffs must be citizens of the state in
which the suit was brought, and all the defendants citizens of some
other state or states.
The right to remove was enlarged by the Act of July 27th
1866. It was therein provided, that if it appeared to the satisfaction of the court, that there was an alien defendant and a citi-
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zen of the state wherein the suit was brought, or that the suit was
against a citizen of the same, and the citizen of another state, and
was for the purpose of enjoining or restraining him or was one in
which there could be a final determination of the controversy, so
far as it concerned him, without the presence of the other defendants, as parties in the cause; in every such case the alien defendant, or the non-resident citizen, might petition the state court for
its removal, as against him, at any time before the trial or final
hearing. But such removal did not take away the right to proceed at the same time in the state court against the other defendants, if the plaintiff desired so to do.
This act was amended, and the jurisdiction still further enlarged
by the Act of March 2d 1867. Under its provisions, when there
was a suit between a citizen of the state in which it was brought,
and a citizen of another state, such non-resident citizen, whether
he was plaintiff or defendant, might remove the cause into this court,
by filing a petition in the state court at any time before trial or
final hearing, upon filing an affidavit in the state court, alleging
that he had reason to believe, and did believe, that from prejudice
or local influence he would not be able to obtain justice in the state
court.

These three acts embrace the general legislation of Congress, on
the subject of the removal of suits, previous to the Act of March
3d 1875, to which reference will be made hereafter; and their
various provisions are grouped under the first, second and third
subdivisions of § 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
where the confused phraseology of the Act of July 27th 1866 has
been corrected and made intelligible.
The subsequent legislation occurs in the Act of March 3d 1875,
entitled "An act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts
of the United States and to regulate the removal of causes from
state courts and for other purposes" (18 stat. 470).
Omitting from the secoind and third sections everything that
does not concern the present inquiry, they provide, in substance,
that any civil suit at law or in equity, pending or hereafter brought
in any state court, * * * in which there shall be a controversybetween eitizens of different states, may be removed by either party
into the Circuit Court of the United States for the proper district,
upon filing a petition in the state court before or at the term at
which the said cause could be first tried and before the trial thereof.
And when, in any such suit, there shall be a controversy which is
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wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully
determined as between them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants, actually interested in such controversy, may
remove said suit.
It was clearly the general design of this act to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court in the matter of the removal of suits as well as
in other matters. Whether such a result has been secured will depend upon the operation of the 10th section, which provides that
all acts and parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of that act
are repealed.
At the hearing the arguments of counsel turned principally upon
the question as to how far the previous legislation conflicted with,
and had been superseded by, the Act of 1875. It seemed to be
conceded on both sides that the first subdivision of sect. 639 of
the Revised Statutes was covered by the more comprehensive provisions of this last act, and the chief controversy was in regard to the
second and third subdivisions. Each of these provides for the removal of causes under a state of circumstances which are not provided for in the Act of 1875, and unless they are in conflict with
the provisions of the later act they are not repealed by it; for instance, the second subdivision authorizes the splitting of a cause
under certain circumstances, leaving some of the parties to go on
with the suit, as to them, in the state court and allowing the
removal as to other parties to this court, whenever there c~uld be
a final determination of the controversy, so far as they were concerned, without the presence of the other parties. The last clause
of the second section of the Act of 1875 has retained some of these
provisions in permitting one or more of either the plaintiffs or defendants to remove the suit when there is a controversy therein
wholly between citizens of different states and which can be fully
determined as between them. But it does not allow the splitting
of the cause; and although one of the plaintiffs or defendants may
petition for the removal under the conditions named, such petition
takes the suit and all the parties to it, and not, as under the other
act, merely a controversy wholly determinable between some of the
parties, leaving the other matters involved therein between other
parties for the action and adjudication of the state courts. And
likewise the third subdivision provides for the removal of the cause
by either a non-resident plaintiff or a non-resident defendant, upon
filing an affidavit bf prejudice or local influence, and this provision
is altogether omitted in the Act of 1875.
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Unless these differences existing between the old and new legislation create a conflict both must stand, because only contrary or
repugnant acts or parts of acts are repealed. And wherein is the
conflict ? Because the Act of 1875 authorizes the removal of the
whole suit under the existence of certain facts, does it necessarily
repeal those features of the Act of 1866, transferred to the revision, which permit a suit to be split and to be removed in part upon
the existence of other and varying facts ? When it is apparent
that it was the intention of Congress to amplify the jurisdiction of
the court, must such a construction be placed upon their act that
the jurisdiction will be restricted? And yet such would be the
result, if it be held, that either the provisions of the Act of 1866,
authorizing a defendant to remove a cause, as to him, or the provisions of the Act of 1867 in regard to prejudice or local influence,
were superseded by the more recent legislation.
Holding, then, that.the second and third subdivisions of § 639
are still in force, the question reverts, whether the present suit is
removable either in whole 'or in part under any existing law ?
The complainant is a corporation, resident of the state wherein
the action is brought. Two of the defendants live in the same
state and one in the state of New York. The petition for removal
has been filed in the state court by the non-resident defendant
alone. If the two other defendants had utited in the petition,
the whole suit could have been removed into this court, under the
provisions of the Act of 1875. They have not joined with the
petitioning defendant, but have answered in the state court, disclaiming all interest in the controversy. Will such disclaimer
bring the case within the last clause of the second section of that
act, which authorizes a single plaintiff or defendant to petition-for
the removal, when the controversy is wholly between citizens of
different states and can be fully determined between them?
'We think not. We must decide upon the case made by the bill
of complainant, and not by the disclaimer of the defendants.
It is, doubtless, true that if immaterial parties have been added,
merely to give jurisdiction, or to hinder a removal, the court would
and ought to disregard their presence: WTood v. Davis, 18 How.
467. But neither Mapes nor Dixson is a nominal party, if the
allegations of the bill, as to their acts or interests, are true. Their
presence is necessary to the complete maintenance and vindication
of the rights of the complainant; for the whole controversy-em-
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bracing indenmity for the past and security and protection for tho
future-cannot be determined without them.
Nor is the suit removable under the third subdivision of § 639.
All the defendants have not joined in the petition ; nor are they
all non-residents of the state; and both of these facts must exist to
bring the case within the provisions of that clause of the section:
Bixby v. Couse et al., 8 Blatch. 73; The Sewing Machine Compazes, 18 Wall. 587.
In the latter case the Supreme Court say: "Either the nonresident plaintiff or non-resident defendant may remove the cause
under the last named act (Act of March 2d 1867), provided all the
plaintiffs or all the defendants join in the petition, and all the party
petitioning are non-residents, as required under the Judiciary Act;
but it is a great mistake to suppose that any such right is conferred by that act, where one or more of the plaintiffs or one or more
of the petitioning defendants are citizens of the state in which the
suit is pending, as the act is destitute of any language which can
be properly construed to confer any such right, unless all the
plaintiffs or all the defendants are non-residents and join in the
petition."
The only remaining inquiry is, whether the suit is removable in
part under the second subdivision of § 639. If it be conceded
that that clause of the section is in force, there is no reasonable
doubt but that the case under consideration is within it.
This is a suit brought, so far as it relates to the petitioning defendant, to restrain and enjoin him ; and it is also one in which
there can be a final determination of the controversy, so far as
concerns him, without the presence of the other defendants, as parties to the cause. It answers to all the requirements of that clause
of the section which allows a severance of the defendants; the
non-resident petitioner coming here for the determination of his
rights, and the other resident defendants remaining in the state
court, in which the controversy, as to them, may be still carried
on by the complainant.
The motion to remand must be refused and the cause will proceed in this court against the petitioning non-resident defendant
alone.'
I See the opinion of BALLARD, J., to the same effect, in Cooke v. Ford, 16 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 417.-ED.
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Supreme Court,of Indiana.
LAUDINE EGGERS

ET AL. V.

SARAII EGGERS

ET AL.

Partial insanity does not as a general rule render a testator incapable of making
a will, unless the insanity enters into or affects the will itself.
But under a statute which declares that no person of "unsound mind" shall be
capable of making a will, the phrase "of unsound nind" includes every species
of p hrtial insanity and avoids a will made by a person partially insane, although
the will was not the offspring of the insanity.
The testimony, of experts is like any other testimony ; its value depends on all
the facts and circumstances of the case, and an instruction that such "opinions
are a very weak class of evidence and depend upon the facts stated for weight,"
is erroneous.
An instruction that the opinions of medical experts upon mental unsoundness
based upon hypothetical cases "are of no value unless the hypothetical cases are
fully sustained by the evidence given in the cause," is erroneous. The hypothetical case may be only partially sustained and yet the opinion of the expert be valuable for some portion of the case.

Tus was a proceeding to set aside an instrument in writing,
with the probate thereof, purporting to be the last will and testament of Hugh Eggers, deceased. The plaintiffs, Laudine Eggers
and Sarah Eliza Brindle, were the only children of the deceased,
and the other plaintiff, John P. Brindle, was the husband of the
said Sarah Eliza. The defendant, Sarah Eggers, was the decedent's widow; and the other defendants, John Eggers, Lon Brindle
and Charles Brindle, were his grandchildren, and all were beneficiaries under the alleged will. The complaint, as amended before the
trial, consisted of two paragraphs. The first charged that the
instrument in question was procured to be executed by the fraud
and undue influence of the said Sarah Eggers and others.
The second charged that at the time of its execution the deceased
was of unsound mind and incapable of making a valid will.
The defendants answered in general denial. There was a trial
by jury and a verdict and judgment for the defendants.
W. B. Wills and Gordon, Brown

Lamb, for appellants.

John C. OZements, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-On the trial the court instructed the jury, amongst
other things, that:"The symptoms of insanity are incapable of description or classification. Insanity is sometimes quite obvious. At other times
KIBLACK,
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it appears in so subtle a form as to elude the observation of the most
experienced physicians. The belief in the existence of mere illusions or hallucinations, the creatures purely of the imagination,
such as no sane man could believe in, are unequivocal evidences of
insanity, but even this would not be sufficient to avoid a will unless
such delusion or insanity had entered into or affected the will itself.
And when the party has correct perception, he will generally be
found competent to make an understanding disposition of property,
and a valid will, unless from imbecility he is incapable of estimating
the just relation of things or of fully recollecting the elements of a
will."
By this instruction the court evidently intended to be understood
to mean that, although a person might be to some extent insane
when he executed a will, yet such insanity would not avoid the
will unless it could be shown to have entered into or affected the
will itself. Independently of any statutory provision on the subject
that might be considered as the law, as applied to what is termed
partial insanity. See 1 Jarman on Wills, 4th Am. ed., p. 60.
Our statute, however, does not permit a person "of unsound mind"
to make a will: 2 Rev. Stats. (1876) 570, sect. 1.
The phrase of "unsound mind," includes idiots, non compotes,
lunatics and distracted persons: 2 R. S. (1876) 313, sect. 797;
also, monomaniacs: see sect. 1, p. 598. In the case of Willett v.
Porter,42 Ind. 250, it was in effect decided that the words "of
unsound mind," include every species of unsoundness of mind.
Adhering to that construction, as we feel justified in doing, partial
insanity is necessarily included as one of the forms of mental unsoundness. It is often difficult to decide when eccentricity or a
merely capricious imagination terminates, and when actual mental
derangement begins, but when a person has become the victim of a
mental derangement amounting to insanity in any form, we are of the
opinion, that under our statute he is incompetent to make a will.
We think the instruction was therefore erroneous.
The court also instructed the jury that: "Some witnesses have
given their opinion of the condition of the mind of the testator,
about the time of the execution of the will, basing such opinions
upon facts stated by themselves to you. These opinions are a very
weak class of testimony, and depend upon the facts stated for weight.
If the facts properly support the opinions, they are of some value,
but if they are not supported by the facts, they are of no value what-
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ever. Some persons have been introduced as experts on the question
of unsoundness. These witnesses gave opinions based upon hypothetical cases. These opinions are of no value, unless the hypothetical cases put to the experts are fully sustained by the evidence
given in the cause. If the hypothetical cases are fully proved
by the evidence, and the experts understand the subject upon
which their opinions are given, those opinions ought to have
some weight, but the .testimony of experts is usually of very
little value in determining the sanity or insanity of a party. The
opinions of experts are not so highly regarded now as formerly,
for while they sometimes afford aid in the determination of facts,
it often happens that experts can be found to testify to any theory,
however absurd, and. they frequently come with biased minds
prepared to support the cause in which they are embarked. I do
not wish to be understood that the witnesses called in this case are
biased. You are the judges of that matter."
We are of opinion that this instruction was also erroneous. It
underrated too much the value of the testimony of the experts as a
class. The value of such testimony depends as much upon all the
facts and circumstances connected with each particular case as that
of any other class of witnesses. It is for the court first to decide
whether a witness is competent to testify as an expert, but when
permitted to testify an expert stands substantially on the same footing as other witnesses as to credibility. His testimony may be
valuable or it may not be, depending upon the manner in which it
may be able to withstand the usual tests of credibility which may
be applied to it: -Davisv. The State, 35 Ind. 496.
It is, we think, laying down too broad a rule to say that the
opinion of an expert can be of no value unless the hypothetical case
put to him is fully sustained by the evidence. A hypothetical case
might be only partially sustained and yet the opinion of the expert
be valuable to some portion of the case.
Again, we think the court was mistaken in saying that "the
testimony of experts is usually of very little value in determining
the sanity or insanity of a party."
The contrary seems to us to be rather the rule. Touching such
an issue, the testimony of experts is usually regarded as an important element in the cause. Our statute for the admission of patients
into the hospital for the insane fully recognises the value of medical witnesses when inquiring into cases of alleged insanity. We do
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not know on what authority the court said to the jury that, "The
opinions of experts are not so highly regarded now as formerly ;"
and we are inclined to think that such is not the recognised d6ctrine
of the authorities.
A modern author says, "T h e whole system of experts, as now
used, is comparatively a modern experiment. It has grown out of
the wonderful growth and increase of science in modern days, and
the development by that means of what was before too recondite
to be anything more than conjectural in the minds of the wisest :"
Washburn on Experts, 1 Am. Law Review 62. Experts may not
well understand the subject about which they testify; they may be
biased in favor of the party who calls them; they may base their
conclusions on false thebries or on mistaken premises, or the facts
may be against them. These objections when well taken go only
to their credibility, and we know of no rule which applies them
with greater force to experts than .to other witnesses. Both the
instructions above quoted being material to the issues involved on
the trial, we must presume they affected the minds of the jury injuriously to the appellants. Other questions of minor importance
are presented by the record, but as they may not again arise in the
cause we will not now consider them.
The judgment is reversed at the costs of the appellee, ana the
cause is remanded for a new trial.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
CITY OF WHEELING v. CAMPBELLET AL.
The maxim nullum tenipus occurit regi applies to sovereignty alone, which means
in this country the United States and the states themselves in their public capacity.
The Statute of Limitations, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary, runs against a municipal corporation the same as against a natural person.

Tuis was a bill in equity, filed by the city of Wheeling on the l1th
day of September 1875, to enjoin the defendants from building a wall,
nnd building thereon, on Madison, now Tenth street, in the city of Wheeling. The bill alleged the 'dedication of the street to public use, and
that the defendants had made an excavation and were building a wall,
on which they had made arrangements to put up a building on their
property on said Tenth street, and that said wall was being built twent2one inches over the line of and on said Tenth street, for a distance of

forty feet along said street, and prayed an injunction, which was granted.
The defendants answered, admitting the dedication of the street, but
averred that they and those under whom they claimed, under the several
deeds of conveyance whieh they exhibited, had held by a building thereon that portion of Tenth street which plaintiff alleged they were build-
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ing upon for forty years prior to the institution of the suit, and that
their possession thereof had been open, notorious, exclusive, continuous
and uninterrupted for all that time, and relied upon their adverse pos.
session to defeat the claim of the city thereto. Proot were taken, and
it was shown on behalf of the city, that the street, for more than filrtytwo years, had been dedicated to the public use, and that the defendants
by their wall had encroached on said street twenty-one inches, for a distance of forty feet along said street. It was clearly shown by the defendants that they had, by themselves and those under whom they
claimed, held open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of said portion of Tenth street under said deeds, the same
as their private property, and had so occupied it with a building thereon
for forty years before the suit was brought. The court dissolved the
injunction, and the city appealed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, J.-The defendants rely upon an adverse possession in
them and those under whom they claim for more than forty years. It
is now too well settled to be controverted, and indeed it is not denied in
this cause, that if the Statute of Limitations will apply to a case at law,
it will, by analogy, be applied to a cause in chancery. But it is ably
insisted by counsel fbr plaintiff that the statute has no application in
this case; that here the maxim nullum temnpus occurit regi applies with
all its force, and he cites a number of pertinent authorities to sustain
the position.
The first case cited is Cross v. May/er, &c., 18 N. J. Eq. 311. The
bill was filed to prevent the authorities of M1orristown from widening
the street and thereby taking ground of the plaintiff which he had
held in possession for about twenty-six years. The chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, "If encroachments of this public
street exist, such encroachments, no matter how ancient and long continued, are clearly public nuisances, and as such abatable. The claim
that this public easement has been curtailed by acquiescence and lapse
of time has no foundation in legal principle. Such I have always understood to be the well established rule of law upon this subject. * * *
* * * It is true that in this country this rule of common law has in
a few instances been rejected, but, nevertheless, it is sustained I think
by a great preponderance of American authority. * * * It is a principle
of policy and appears to have been thought almost indispensable for the
protection of those privileges in which the whole Icommunity is interested; and it may well be doubted if it does not exist in some form in
the jurisprudence of every civilized people." The injunction was dissolved. This decree was rendered in 1867.
Drygest v. Schenck-, 23 Wend. 446, cited by counsel for the city, was a
suit brought to recover damages for injury to a mare, which fell through a
bridge on a public highway. The road passed over the land of the defendant, and.he had dug a ditch across the road and put a bridge over it, but
had neglected to keep it in repair, claiming that he was not bound to do
so. While the judge used the following language quoted by counsel for
the city that "no length of time will legalize a nuisance, for the very reason while it continues a mere trifle no one thinks of taking measures to
have it removed and thus the public would be sure to suffer," yet it can
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have no pplication to this case, because the defendant there was not
attempting to hold adversely to the public.
Jersey (ity, v. State, 1 Vroom 521, was a controversy as to the right to
widen a street where there had been long-continued possession of the
ground, and the chief justice in his opinion said, "while the city is in its
nascent state and before the streets are improved, little regard is had to
strict street lines. Encroaching lot-owners, sometimes for temporary
convenience, and at other times intending permanently to acquire the
lands, often build within the street lines; they did so in this case, but
by so doing acquired no right of permanent possession or title. The
contrary doctrine would effectually destroy great public rights in all
cities, which, like Jersey City, depend upon the doctrine of dedication
for the preservation of their parks and streets."
The next case cited by counsel for the city is Simmons v. Cornell, 1 R. I. 519. That was an action of trespass for breaking and
entering the close of the plaintiff, &c. The defendant was surveyor of
highways of the town of Tiverton, and had entered upon the'premises
which were claimed by him to be part of the highway in said town, for
the purpose of amending and repairing said way. It was proved in the
case that the land in question had been for, more than twenty years in
the exclusive possession and enclosure of the plaintiff and those under
whom he claimed, There was a verdict under the instructions of the
court for the defendant; and the plaintiff took the case to the Supreme
Court of the state, and that court held that "long possession under
claims of right is evidence of right if not interrupted or disturbed, and
twenty years' possession is in general deemed conclusive as between individuals. But it is not so against the king or sovereign ; the same rules
which apply to individuals do not apply to the public or the state."
In City of Philadelphiav. Philadelphia& Reading Railroad Co., 58
Penna. 263, it was held, that " the public are not to be deprived of their
rights by encroachment. Buildings erected on public grounds or on
highways acquire no right either on account of time or expenditures."
See also Commonwealth v. McDonald, 16 S. & R. 401. But in this
case RoGeRS, J., in a dissenting opinion, said, "I cannot exactly agree
with the broad proposition laid down, that no length of time coupled
with the enjoyment of a right of property will be a bar to an indictment
for a nuisance. I look upon it as a doctrine of the most extensive nature,
and alarming in its consequences. It will affect more or less most of
the towns in Pennsylvania and may lead to a scene of controversy,
destructive to private rights and the public peace." See also Rung v.
Shoenberger, 2 Watts 23.
In Mayor v. Magner, 4 Martin (La.) 1, it was held that, "land not
susceptible of alienation cannot be acquired by prescription."
Commonwealth v. Alburger et al., 1 Whart. 469, was an indictment
against Alburger and others for a nuisance in the erection of a certain fence and wooden building upon Franklin Square. The defendants were the trustees, elders and deacons of "The German Reformed
Congregation in the City of Philadelphia," and blaimed the exclusive
right to the occupation of a portion of said square, under a warrant
from Thomas Penn, the then proprietary, dated the 18th June.1741,
a survey made in December 1763, and a patent granted in the same
month and year. It was held by the Supreme Court that, "It is well
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settled that lapse of time furnishes no defence for an encroachment on a
public right, such as the erecting of an obstruction on a street or public square * * * ; those principles indeed pervade the laws of the most
enlightened nations as well as our own code, and are essential to the protection of public rights, which would be gradually frittered away, if the
want of complaint or prosecution gave the party a right. Individuals
may reasonably be held to a limited period to enforce their right against
adverse occupants, because they have interest sufficient to make them
vigilant. But in public rights of property, each individual feels but a
slight interest, and rather tolerates even a manifest encroachment, than
seeks a dispute to set it right." In Barter v. The Commonwcalth, 3
P. & W. 253, it was held "that the title of a corporation to the soil,
for uses that conduce to the public enjoyment and convenience, is paramount and exclusive, and no private occupancy for whatever time and
whether adverse or by permission, can vest a title inconsistent with it."
In Mayor of Jersey City v. Morris Canal & Banking Co.. 1 Beasley
561, the judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, said, " And the
Supreme Court of Vermont, in Knight v. IHcaton, 22 Verm. 480, held,
that the enclosure and occupation of land within the limits of a highway for twenty years, under a claim of right, made title by prescription
against the public, in the occupier. To this case I cannot yield my assent; it would render valid, clear encroachments upon public highways,
which, in every part of our state, are a source of constant complaint
and vexation. Some of our highways have been so narrowed by encroachments as to be almost impassable. It is an application of the
doctrine of adverse possession uncalled for, and eminently disastrous to
the public interests."
There is a dictum of the judge in Aayor and Aldermen of Memphis
v. .Lenore, 6 Caldw. 412, to the effect, that adverse possession for the
time prescribed by the statute would not be available against the proceedings of the city to abate a nuisance.
Judge DILLON, in his work on Municipal Corporations, collects the
cases on this subject in his notes and comes to the following conclusion
in see. 533: " Upon consideration it will perhaps appear that the following view is correct: Municipal corporations as we have seen have in
some respects a double character. One public, the other (by way of
distinction) private. As respects property not held for public use, or
upon public trusts, and as respects contracts and rights of a private nature,
there is no reason why such corporations should not fall within limitation statutes, and be affected by them. For example, in an action on a
contract or for tort, a municipal corporation may plead or have pleaded
against it the Statute of Limitations. But such a corporation does not
own and cannot alien public streets or places, and no laches on its part
or on that of its officers can defeat the right of the public thereto, yet
there may grow up in consequence private rights of more persuasive
force in the particular cause than that of the public. It will perhaps be
found that cases will arise of such a character that justice requires that
an equitable estoppel shall be asserted even against the public, but if so,
such cases will form a law unto themselves, and do not fall within the
legal operation of limitation enactments. The author cannot assent to
the doctrine that as respects public rights municipal corporations are
within ordinary limitation statutes. It is unsafe to recognise such a
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principle; but there is no danger in recognising the principle of an
estoppel in pmis as applicable to such cases, as this leaves the court to
decide the question, not by the mere lapse of time, but by all the circumstances of the case, to hold the public estopped or not as right and
justice may require."
In the case of the Izlabitants of Arundel v. McCullough,10 Mass.
75, cited in the case of Commonwealth v. McDonald, supra, we do not
think the decision sustains the position taken by the learned judge
who cites it; all the court says upon the subject is: "In this case
no such authority has been given (i. e., to build the bridge over the
stream); and the only claim of a right to continue the bridge rests
upon the antiquity of the bridge,-aud the laying out of a road over
the river in the year 1771. But we think neither of these facts sanctioned the obstruction of the river, so as to prevent those who had occasion to transport vessels up and down, from removing it, if necessary to
a safe and convenient passage. Public rights cannot be destroyed by
long-continued encroachments ; at least the party who claims the exercise of any right inconsistent with the free enjoyment of a public easement or privilege must put himself on the ground of prescription, unless
he has a grant or some valid authority from the government; and a
right by prescription does not exist in the present case."
The case of Renshaw v. Bunting, 1 Gray 203, was cited to sustain
the opinion of the court in the case of Jersey City v. Morris Canal &
Baukiing Co., supra, and we cannot see that it does so, but is rather an
authority on the other side. In delivering the opinion of the court,
MERRICK, J., used the following language, "The objection of the plaintiff, that if First street was legally laid out, as before mentioned, in 1805,
he has since acquired a title to the land over which it was laid 'by adverse possession for more than twenty years, cannot upon the facts agreed
be sustained, first, because, as has already been stated, the plaintiff shows
no deed to himself of the land in controversy, from any former occupant, and, secondly, because his possession and the possession of those
who preceded him was perfectly consistent with the rights of the town
of Boston. The very nature of the rights vested in the town by the
laying out of the streets in South Boston, rendered it impossible that
there should be as against them any adverse possession until an official
order or adjudication was made that the street should be completed.
There never having been any such order for the completion of that part
of First street now in controversy previously to the year 1851, no prior
possession or occupancy of the land within its limits was adverse to the
rights of the city of Boston, and no title destructive of their rights
could in that way have been acquired." This is all that is said in the
case upon the subject, and there is nothing in it that supports the position that the Statute of Limitations will not run against a municipal
corporation, but on the other hand it seems to recognise the fact that
the rights of the city might be defeated by a sufficient adverse possession.
I propose now to refer to a number of decisions of the courts of
last resort of different states, which recognise the doctrine that municipal corporations are like individuals subject to the effect of statutes of
limitation. In the case of Kelly's Lessee v. Greenfield, 2 Harris &
MlHenry 138, decided in 1785, the judge who pronounced the opinion
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of the court uses the form of questions and answers, and the following
question is found on page 137, and the answer thereto on page 138:
"Had the proprietor the same rights with respect to Marylmld that the
king of Great Britain had in Englandin consequence of the fifth section
in the charter to him by the king from his being lord of the fie ?"
The answer is "we are clearly of opinion he had iot. His rights
were derived under the charter ; the fourth section of which grants to
him 'all and singular such ample rights, jurisdictions, &c., as any
Bishop of Durham within the bishopric or county palatine of Durham
had.' The law writers upon the subject of the palatinate rights * * *
in enumerating the rights, have never placed them upon a fboting with
the courts of the king; and the maxim nullum temnzits occzirit regi has
never been applied, that we can find, to any but the king himself'" In
Vermont, by express statute in 1850, the state is not exempt from the
Statute of Limitations. In Knight v. ileaton, 22 Vt. 481, REDFIELD,
J., said, "I see no good reason why one may not set up prescriptive and
presumptive rights against the public as well as against individuals.
And there is perhaps no good reason why such prescriptions should not
apply as well against the public as in their favor." In the case of Tarick v. The Coporation of New York, 4 Johns. Ch. 53, it appeared to
claimed
be admitted as a fact that the plaintiff and those under whom lie
had had uninterrupted possession of the premises, claiming themi as
their own, up to the extent of their possession north, for upwards of
twenty-five years before the filing of the bill; and that the stable, fence,
&c.,
were all that time standing on the line on St. David street to which
he claimed. Chancellor KENT said, " after such a length of time, it is
right and just that the plaintiff should be protected in the enjoyment of
his property, and that he should not be disturbed by any act or entry of
the corporation of the city, under the pretence or alleg'ttion that the
fence and buildings stand or encroach on part of the public highway.
The defendants must first acquire possession of the ground in dispute,
not by forcible entry, but by the regular process of law, before they can
be permitted to use it as a street. The injunction which was granted
upon the filing of the bill went no further than to restrain the defendants
from entering upon and digging and throwing down and destroying the
land sopossessed by the plaintiff. The injunction was not intended to
interfere with the defendants in digging down the street close up to the
line possessed by the plaintiff, though such digging might by necessary
consequence cause the soil of the plaintiff, consisting of sand and gravel,
to fall in upon the excavated street. Whatever might be the rights of
the parties growing out of such fact, it was not the purpose of the injunction to interfere with such a case. The principle upon which the
injunction so modified is to be upheld, is that after a claim of right, accompanied with actual and constant possession for twenty-five years and
upwards, the corporation of New York cannot be permitted without due
process of law to enter upon the possession of the plaintiff and pull down
buildings, fences, &c., under their right to' regulate highways. The
injunction must be continued and made perpetual, or until the defendants have established at law their right to the ground in question."
I have found nothing in any of the cases which I have examined
in the reports of the courts of New York, that is in opposition to the
principles enunciated in the above cited opinion of Chancellor KENT.
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In The IJhabitantsof the Town of Litchfield v. Wilmot, 2 Root 288, it
was held, that " fifteen years uninterrupted possession of a highway,
will be a bar to the town's right of recovering it for the use of a highway." This case was dcided in 1795, and the decision was controlled
by a statute of Connecticut, limiting the pulling down and removing
encroachments on highways, as well as on common land, to fifteen years.
Armstrong v. Dalton, 4 Dev. 368, was an action of assumpsit by the
plaintiff, as chairman of Stokes County Court, against the defendant, the
executor of David Walton, for money paid to the testator as treasurer
of public buildings and not accounted for. The plea was the Statute of
Limitations. The judge charged the jury, that the Statute of Limitations did not bar the state, and inasmuch as the legislature had delegated to the county courts for more convenient administration of justice
a portion of the sovereign power, it did not bar their action, the money
claimed being the property of the public. There was a verdict for
plaintiff and defendant appealed. DANIEL, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court, said, "Public corporations, as distinguised from private
corporations, are such as exist for public political purposes only, such as
counties, cities, towns and villages. They are founded by the government for public purposes and the whole interest in them belongs to the
public, viz., to the counties, towns, &c. But the reason which upholds
the rule of nuilum tempus, &e., when applied to the sovereign, does not,
in our opinion, excuse the laches of the officers of these small communities. The plea of nullurn tempus, &c., is, as before mentioned, one
that peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or to the commonwealth, to be
exercised for the public good. * * * The king or state cannot be presumed to mean wrong or to have an interest inconsistent with justice.
But these communities, like the individuals who compose them, have no
such legal presumption in their favor. No authority is shown to support the position that they are not like other corporations or private persons subject to the operation of the statutes of limitations, nor can wesee any reason which can bring them within the exception, which is
admitted to apply to the sovereign and the state." The judgment was
reversed.
In South Carolina it was held, that a continued and adverse
obstruction for ten years, of a right of way by the owner of the soil
over which it passes, bars, under the Statute of Limitations, the right
to the easement: Bowen v.
, 6 Rich. 298.
The way referred to
in this case was a private way, but such ways are also public: State v.
Fetter, 7 Rich. 390.
, In the ease of the City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Texas, ROBERTS,
J., after citing with approbation Rowanes Ezrs v. Town of Portland,8
B. Mon. 259, said, "our Statute of Limitation of five years confers upon
the possessor ' full title precluding all claims except. that of the government, and saving the disability of nonage, coverture or insanity. By
our statute also the right of entry is barred in ten years. It has often
been held as to ways and watercourses, that if the right of entry be
barred, the right of recovery is lost. The possessidn that will give title
to a street under this statute should not only be under claim of a deed,
&c., but it should be adverse and so exclusive in its nature as to give
notice unequivocally of an assertion of individual right to the street.
This strictness in the rule as to possession of streets and other common
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property results as a necessary consequence from the character of the
property, and the uses to which it is applied. Nothing short of a visible
appropriation of it to the exclusion of the public except at the discretion of the possessor, can in such case be held to be adverse." Rowan's
Ex'r's v. Town of Portland, 8 B. Mon. 232, cited in tle above case in
23 Texas, was a contest as to the right to part of a street in said town.
Chief Justice MARSHALL, of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in delivering the opinion of the court, at page 259, says, " It only remains then
to inquire how far any portions of the slip in question have been freed
from the dedication to the public and become private property by an
adverse possession and claim of individual right for twenty years before
this suit was brought. That the public right as growing out of the dedication in this case was subject to be divested and defiated by such possession admits as we think of no doubt. The dedication was not to the
use of tie commonwealth as a corporate being, and .invested no title or
interest in it. The maxim nuitlinn temnpus occurit regi is, therefore, inapplicable." Dadlell v. Trustees of Fuaklfort, 12 B. Mon. 610, was an
injunction by Dudley to restrain the said trustees from intcrflerin- with
his property on Mero street in said town. The marshal, acting under
authority of the board of trustees, was about to execute the order of said
board to remove obstructions on said street, the enclosure of said Dudley,
claiming it was on the street when the injunction was obtained. The
plaintiff claimed the property as his own, and relied on the Statute of
Limitations. IIisE, J., who delivered the opinion of the Court. of Appeals, said, " If the private citizens at any time encroach with their
buildings and enclosures upon the public streets the municipal authorities
should in the exercise of proper vigilance, and of their undoubted authority, interpose by the legal means provided in their charter to prevent
such encroachment in due thne, and thus preserve for public use the
squares, streets and alleys of the town in their original dimensions; but
if a private individual or citizen has been permitted to remain in the
continued adverse actual possession of public grounds or of a public"
street, or of part of a street as embraced within his enclosure or covered
by his dwelling or other buildings, for a period of twenty years or more
without interruption, such citizen will be vested thereby with the complete title to the ground so actually occupied by him, and a title thus
perfected by time will be just as available against a municipal corporation
as it would be against an individual whose elder title and right of entry
may be barred by a continued adverse possession for twenty years of'
his land. - A municipal corporation or any other artificial body vested with
corporate rights and functions have no more right than a natural man to
claim the benefit and advantage of the maxim nuluian tempus occurit
regi."
The same doctrine was held in Alvin & Co. v. Town of Henderson,
16 B. Mon. 131. In Clements v. Auaerson et al., 46 Miss. 581, it was
held that "the maxim nullum tempus, &c., in analogy to the reason and
policy of the principle, should be extended in America to those organisms
of government which have the attributes of sovereignty, as the United
States and the severai states, and not to those local bodies, such as cities
and counties, which are derivative and emanations of the sovereign,
created for the purpose of local convenience, subject at all times to be
changed and modified at the pleasure of the government."
VOL. XXVI.-50
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In Comity of St. C,,rles v. Powcll, 22 Mo. 525, the court held that
the immunity (from the effect of limitation statutes), however it seems,
was even at common law an attribute of sovereignty only, and did not
belong to the municipal Corporations, or other local authorities established to manage the affairs of the political subdivisions of the state."
To the same effect is School Directors of St. Charles Township v.
George et al., 50 Mo. 194. In the City of Cincinnativ. BEans, 5 Ohio
St. 594, it appeared that in the year 1852, the city by order of the city
councils removed the front of a store-house belonging to Evans on Main
street, in which he was carrying on the business of a merchant tailor.
Evans brought an action against the city to recover for the injuries sustained by the removal of the front of his building and the consequent
interruption of his business. It appeared from the bill of exceptions
taken at the trial below, that the plaintiff produced evidence tending to
show that he erected his building on what was then supposed to be and
which he still Contended was the original line of the street, and that
the line was "given by the city surveyor ;" that the houses both above
and below him were then built upon the same line with his house, and
that he had occupied the ground since 1822. ' This evidence was objected to, and the objectign overruled and the evidence permitted to go
to the jury, to which ruling the defendant excepted. On the other side
evidence was produced going to show that Evans had built over the
original line of the street as laid out by the original survey ; that this
line was established by well-known corners, landmarks and secondary
monuments ; that it had been built by, as far back as 1818, and that
Evans's building, at the time of the removal of the front thereof, was
over the line of the street and in the street, and that only so much
thereof was removed as projected into and over the street. The court
instructed the jury substantially, that whatever had been the original
line of the street, if the plaintiff had for more than twenty-one years
held and occupied the ground adversely to the city, claiming it as his
own, that the city had no right to disturb him in his possession. The
verdict was for the plaintiff and judgment entered thereon, to which
judgment the defendant, the city, obtained a writ of error. In delivering the opinion of the court, IANNEY, C, J., cited Lessee of the City
of Cincinnati v. The First Presbyterian Church, 8 Ohio 298, and made
the language of the court in that case.his own; which is, "that municipal corporations are subject to the operation of the Statute of Limitations in the same manner and to the same extent as natural persons,
and as a consequence that notorious and uninterrupted possession by a
private individual under a claim of right of land dedicated to a city for
streets or public squares for more than twenty-one years, will bar the
claim of the city to its use." He further said, "this case (in 8 Ohio)
was decided in 1838, was fully argued by eminent counsel and carefully
considered by the court. In following it now, we not only yield the
respect due to the decision of a court of last resort, which has so long
been supposed to have settled the law, but with .a full approval of the
principles upon which it is founded"
These decisions were again approved in Lane v. Kennedy et al., 13 Ohio St. 42.
The City of Peoria v. Johnston, 56 Il1. 45, was an injunction by
Johnston to enjoin the city from taking possession of land about sixteen
feet wide, then forming a part of complainant's enclosure between his
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house and Main street in said city, and from making it as part of the
street.. The city answered, proofs were taken and the injunction made
perpetual. The only groqnd upon which the city claimed the right to a
part of the complainant's enclosure was the dedication thereof by its
former owner, Hale. The complainant had held undisturbed po.ession
of the property for twenty-eight years prior to the institution of his suit.
The city appealed, and the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the
court, said, " Conceding this highway was laid out as claimed by appellants, and conceding there was an intention to dedicate the premises
on the southeast of section 4, we are of the opinion that the adverse
possession of the appellees, open and exclusive as it has been, and the
complete non-user of the easement by the public for more than twenty
years, are a sufficient answer to the claim now made by the city." The
decree was affirmed.
In 0. R. I & P. R. R. Co. v. City of Joliet, 79 I1. 40, the judge
who delivered the opinion of the court, quoted tie above language and
added: " We would not be understood in making this citation as sanctioning the langu'rge thus used, in its full breadth, that in such case the
mere non-use of the easement by the public for more than twenty years
would bar the claim, but the reference is made as having pertinence here
under the facts of this case." There is one case in Virginia bearing
directly upon tis subject. aty of Richmold v. Poe, Trustee, 24 Gratt.
149. was an injunction obtained by said Poe, trustee, for Mrs. Bradley
T. Johnson, to enjoin the city of Richmond from proceeding to widen
Franklin street by extending its northern line so as to include a part of
the lot- held by said trustee; the ground on which he rested his claim
to enjoin the city was, that he and those under whom he claimed
had been in possession of said lot from 1809 to 1871, when the bill was
filed. The city relied upon a dedication of the ground as a public street
prior to the time the oldest deed under which plaintiff claimed was executed. The injunction was perpetuated unless and until the city
should acquire the legal right to widen the street in the manner prescribed by law. From the decree perpetuating the injunction the city
appealed. The chancellor who rendered the decree in the court below,
said, ",But in this case the ground was enclosed and there was adverse
possession for over thirty years acquiesced in by the city; and this
would have destroyed the right of the city if it ever existed." Judge
MONCURE, who delivered the opinion of the court, referring to the opinion of the chancellor, which was made a part of the record in the cause,
said. "That opinion covers the whole case and strongly presents the
principles upon which it rests ; and as we entirely concur in it, we deem
it sufficient to express such concurrence, without adding anything to
what is there said or saying substantially the same thing in different
words." The decree was affirmed.
As bearing upon the subject, see 3fanchester Cotton Mills v. Town of
Manchester, 25 Grat. 825. The City of Pellav. ,Scholte, 24 Iowa 283, decided in June 1868, was a contest as to the right of the city to a certian plat
of ground in said city designated on the plat thereof as "Garden Square."
The city filed a petition in equity " claiming against the defendants,
the original proprietors of Pella and who laid out the same, that the said
'Garden Square' was dedicated to the public, and that the defendants,
H. P. Scholte and his wife (his voluntary grantee) denied the public
right and obstructed the public enjoyment of the square, and prayed to
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have its right to the control of the square judicially established. The
defendants answered denying the alleged dedication of the square to the
public use and setting up the Statute of Limitations, averring eighteen
years' quiet uninterrupted use and enjoyment bf the square as their private property. Upon the issue thus made proofs were taken, and the
court below dismissed the petition, and the city appealed. Chief Justice DILLON, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, said,
"Under these circumstances the question recurs, whether (assuming
that there had been a dedication or the square in 1847 or 1848) the
defendants may insist upon the bar of the Statute of Limitations. It
will be assumed that the statute would not begin to run in favor of the
defendant until the townor city was incorporated, charged with the duty
of watching, and possessed with the power of asserting and protecting
the rights of the intended donee. The city was organized August 5th
1855. This suit to assert the right of the city to the square was not
brought until February 26th 1866, more than ten years after the incorporation of the plaintiff. To actions of this character, though brought in
equity, the ten years' limitation applies directly or by analogy. This is
not disputed by counsel. * * * Rights of this character may be acquired
by the public by the requisite user: Onslott v. Murray, 22 Iowa 457.
And it would seem reasonable that the public, with knowledge of its
rights and of tlhe adverse claim of an individual, may lose these rights in
a similar manner. Of course it is well understood that statutes of limitations do not constructively apply to the state orsovereignty. But the
prineiple has not, so far as we know, been extended to municipal or publie corporations. On the contrary, it has been expressly held that those
corporations are within the Statute of Limitations, the same as natural
persons: Cincinnati v. The Church. 8 Ohio St. 298 (1838), followed in
Same v. Evans, 5 Id. (1855). See also Rowan v: Portland,8 B. Mon.
250, 258 ; North Ilempstead v. I7empsteod, 2 Wend. 109, 137 ; Denton
v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320, 338. Whether there may not be some
limitations on this general doctrine, arising out of the want of knowledge
of the public corporation or its officers, of its rights, or of the adverse
rights sought to be asserted against it, we need not stop to inquire. For
in this case the right claimed by the defendant has been openly asserted
by him and fully known to the city ever since its first organization.
The present case is, therefore, a proper one for the application of the
statute or the principle of repose on which it rests." This is the same
Judge DILLON, who not long after the above opinion was announced
published his excellent work on " Municipal Corporations," in which
he says, in sect. 533, " The author cannot assent to the doctrine, that as
respects public righta mudicipal corporations are within ordinary limitation statutes. It is unsafe to recognise such a principle." What new
light had dawned upon the distinguished judge after he had written his
lucid opinion in Pella v. Scholte ? He certainly had not ascertained
that the current of decisions on the subject was against him; for the
review we have made of the authorities cited in his notes shows, thatt to
sustain his opinion they are as a river, while to support the text in his
work-they are as a rivulet. We think he was right in his opinion and
wrong in his text-book. The judge in this case is better than the author.
Judge DILLON, in sect. 533 of his work, gives as a reason why no laches
on the part of a municipal corporation or its officers can defeat the right
of the public to public streets and places that such corporation does not
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own and cannot alien such public streets or places. But we think this
reason is not sound. The doctrine of adverse possession does not result
from a presumption after a long lapse of time that the party against
whom the adverse possession is held has granted the property to the
party in possession, but it is held under a claim of title independent of
the party who originally owned the land. As the maxim nu//un tempus,
&e., only applies to sovereignty, and the sovereign cannot transmit it to
persons or corporations, a municipal corporation cannot claim the exemption under it any more than a natural person, although it may hold property in trust for the public.
As we have seen, the courts of last resort in the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode. Island and Louisiana have held, that the
maxim nullun. tenqus occurit regi is not restricted in its application to
sovereignty, but that it applies to municipal corporations as trustees of
the rights of the public; while, on the other hand, the highest courts of
Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Texas, Missouri, Kentucky,
Ohio, Illinois and Iowa, have restricted the application of the maxim to
sovereignty alone, and most of said courts have, in express terms, in
cases requiring the decision, held that municipal corporations, like
natural persons, are subject to limitation statutes. While able judges
have held the former doctrine, we have Chancellor KENT, Judges lEDFIELD, MARSHALL, MONCURE, RANNEY, and other eminent jurists,
holding to the latter, and Judge DILLON, perhaps no less distinguished
than any of the others, on both sides of the question. We see no reason why a municipal corporation should not be held to the same degree
of diligence, in guarding their streets and squares from encroachments,
as natural persons are in protecting their property from the adverse
claims of others. We do see great reason why no time should bar the
sovereign power, because the officers of the sovereign, whether king or
state, have such various and onerous duties to perform that the rights
of the sovereign may be neglected, and all the people of the kingdom
or state are interested in having the rights of the sovereign preserved
intact, and not subject to be impaired or lost by the neglect of officers;
but the same reason does not apply to a municipal corporation.
A city or town is a compact community with its city or town council,
its committees on streets and alleys, and its street commissioners, whose
special duty it is to see that the streets and alleys and squares are kept
in proper order and free from obstructions and encroachments ; and if,
with all this machinery and power confined to so narrow a compass and
the interest of the corporation to exercise it, the city authorities permit
an individual to encroach upon the streets, alleys or squares of the city
and hold, enjoy and occupy the same, claiming it as his own under his
title, without interruption or disturbance in that right for the period
mentioned in the Statute of Limitations, the city not only does, but we
think according to reason as wdll as authority ought to lose all right
thereto. In Virginia, it has always been held, that the maxim nodlu,
tenpus, &e., applies to sovereignty, and Judge LEE, in Levasser v. Ilashburn, 11 Gratt. 572,.in giving the reason for the maxim, said: "The
reason sometimes assigned why no laches shall be imputed to the king
is that he is continually busied for the public good and has not leisure
to assert his right within the period limited to subjects. A better rea-
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son is the great public policy of preserving public rights and property
from danage and loss through the negligence of public officers. This
reason certainly is equally if not more cogent in a representative government where the power of the people is delegated to others, and must be
exercised by thenm if exercised at all; and accordingly the principle is
held to have been transferred to the sovereign people of this country
when they succeeded to the rights of the king of Great Britain and
formed independent governments within the respective states."
This principle we approve and regard the exemption frolii the effects
of limitation statutes as essential to the well being of the government of
the states ; but this exemption belongs and appertains to sovereignty
alone. The reason for it is very apparent; if the statutes of limitations
would run against the state, her public lands, if she had any, would be
liable to be taken possession of by squatters, who would hold it for the
time required by the statute and defy the state; and the state in that
portion being sparsely populated, there would be few or none to complain,
as it would be the cheapest way to obtain lands from the state. The
highways of the state would be liable to be impaired or destroyed by encroachnients, and the country not being thickly settled and the neighbors
all acquainted with each other, and the state officers being remote from
these highways, there would perhaps be little complaint.
But in a city or town, where so many people are to suffer inconveniences by such encroachments, and the officers of the city or town are
on the spot, such encroachments are not apt to be tolerated for a long
period ; and they would be less likely to be tolerated, if it was known
that an uninterrupted possession of a street, alley or square would in a
certain number of years give title to the occupier. The wholesome doctrine that no time shall bar the state has been abolished by a section in
the code of West Virginia, which if allowed to remain until ten years
after it went into operation may be fruitful of much mischief in this
state. It is sec. 20, of chap. 35, and is as follows: "Every statute of
limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the state,
but as to claims heretofbre accrued the time shall be computed as commencing when this chapter takes effect." This statute has no application to this cause, because after the time came to sue, ten years had not
elapsed before the suit was brought. The right to bring suit to recover land in this state is barred in ten years. It is clearly proved in
this cause that the defendants, and those under whom they claimed, had,
prior to the institution of this suit, forty years uninterrupted, open,
notorious and continuous possession of the portion of Madison street in
controversy under claim of title thereto, and such adverse possession
gives the defendant the right to hold the same.
It is not a little remarkable that so
learned, able and elaborate a review of
the subject as is made in the foregoing
opinion should entirely omit all referenc to the real ground upon which the
decisions in Pennsylvania and other
states which are dissented from, proceed. That a municipal corporation is
subject to statutes of limitation in re-

ference to its contracts and other matters
in which it acts on its own powers solely is not questioned anywhere, but in
other matters, where it represents the
state it has for the preservation of the
public rights the authority and power
of the state to the extent necessary for
the execution of the trust imposed upon
it. And its control over its streets and
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public squares belongs to this latter
class. The streets in a city are not the
property of the city ; they are highways
of the Commonwealth. For certain
purposes and to certain extent, the city
is charged with authority over them,
and bound to keep them fin repair and
good condition, just as the parishes and
even private owners always were bound
to keep the king's highways in repair :
1 Blacks. Com. 357 ; but the city no
more owns them than the janitor or
watehman owns the building of which
'
he is in charge.
It was for a long time doubted even
if the city had sufficient interest or title
in the streets to maintain a bill tbr the
removal of a purpresture without tie'
attorney general as party complainant:
Commissioners of Afoyanier;ing vi. Long,
1 Pars. 148,
When, therefore, it is 'said in the
Pennsvlvania and other cases that the
maxim nullum tempus, &e., applies in'
favor of a municipal corporation in resisting encroachments on the 'public
highways, no more is said than that the
corporation, in enforcing as the agent
of the state the, state's right in the
state's property, has the benefit of a
maxim that by universal agreement the
state is entitled to when acting in its
own behalf. It can make no difference
whether the state proceeds directly in
its own name or indirectly by its agent;
where the object is 'the maintenance of
the state's dominion in the state's property the measure of its legal 'rights
must always he the same.
This much the learned judge concedes
in the concluding part of his opinion
(p. 398), where he says" if the statutes
of limitations would run against the
state, her public lands would be liable
to be taken possession of-n * *; the
highways of the state would be liable to
be impaired or destroyed by*encroachments, and the country not being thickly
settled * * * there'would perhaps be
little complaint."2 It may be doubted

as a practical matter whether the public
interests are any less likely to receivo
asiarse rural district
public attention iil
than in a'citv. That 'very one's business is nobody's business, is a populr
'sayingat least as frcqueptly exempliied
in town as in countjy. But the greater
or less practical danger of neglect of the
public interests has really nothing to do
with the reasons for or the application
of the maxim ,dlu11 tcmlnp occur! reqli.
It suited the fancy of the times and the
,loyalty of the ancient lawyers to rest the
maxim on the gropnd that the king was
too busy with the publive\el fare to attend
to minor matters, but the real ground, as
already refdrred t6, was the great principle of public policy that, the property
and rights of the whole community
vested in the Commonwealth for the
.purpos6 of permanent, preservation
should be incapable of being lost either
bi'accident or intention of the public
officers in whose temporary chargelthey
should be. Whether it he a road through
the wilderness or a city thoroughrare,
if it be the pioperty'oftle <tate it cannot
be taken away in whole 'or in pdirt by
any private nerbichment, however long
continued.
When, therefore, the learned judge
in the principal case conceded that statutes of limitation do not and cannot apply against the title of the state to the
state's propertyj lie seems to is to, have
given away his argument against the
decisions which he criticises, at least in
Pennsylvania, New Jersey and other
states where the street% in cities, though
under municipal control, are the property
of the Commonwealth. In other states,
if any there be, where the title as well
as the custody of streets is in the municipality, the argument of, the principal
-case would be free from this objection,
and it-may possibly belthat the opposing
lines of decision could be harmonized
more or less completely by a consideration of this distinction.,
J. T. Mk.

